Abstract-Over the past five years, the industry has learned that photovoltaic (PV) system fault protection must be refined to include additional fault protection not provided in most existing PV system installations. Using a failure mode and effects analysis scoring system, this study evaluated the risk associated with 13 faults that could be missed by typical PV System fault protection and the effectiveness of 20 different solutions in containing these faults. Based on the analysis in this study, the ground fault protection in all new PV systems should be capable of detecting any ground fault with 50 mA or more of fault current to address the highest risk faults. For resistively grounded systems, both high-and low-risk faults can be prevented by using a combination of combiner box arc-fault circuit interrupt (AFCI) protection and either continuous isolation monitoring or inverter input differential current protection. For solidly grounded systems, combiner box AFCI protection should be paired with either higher sensitivity current detectors in the ground bond or inverter input differential current protection.
I. INTRODUCTION

O
VER the past few years, it has become clear that current photovoltaic (PV) system design practices need to be refined to improve protection against electrical faults involving ground faults on grounded conductors. Since 2009, there have been several thermal events in PV systems that were caused by a PV system not properly responding to a grounded conductor ground fault. The vulnerability was most widely publicized by the Bakersfield Fire [1] and the Mt. Holly Fire in North Carolina [2] . The common characteristics between these and other less publicized events are that 1) a ground fault on a grounded conductor went undetected because the fault current was below the trip setting in the system ground fault protection (GFP), and 2) a second ground fault occurred on an ungrounded conductor at a potentially much later point in time. The second ground fault activated the PV System's GFP, but the presence of the grounded conductor ground fault effectively allowed the fault current to bypass the GFP and continue flowing, rendering the GFP ineffective. The broad scenario behind all three of these thermal events has been dubbed the Blind Spot Fault and M. J. Albers is with SunPower Corporation, Richmond, CA 94804 USA (e-mail: mark.albers@sunpower.com).
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is discussed in detail in a 2013 report published by Solar ABCs Ground Fault Research Project [3] . SunPower Corporation completed a study with DNV GL. (formerly BEW Engineering) to investigate the effectiveness of alternative mitigation methods that protect against the blind-spot fault and numerous other types of dc faults that can occur in a PV system. During this study, 13 different faults and 20 mitigation methods were evaluated using a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) scoring system. The FMEA scoring system provided a means for quantifying the risk associated with each fault and the effectiveness of the various mitigation methods against each fault. The FMEA results identified the highest risk faults and the best solutions for dealing with these faults. In addition, the compliance of each mitigation method with the National Electrical Code (NEC) [4] was reviewed along with the commercial availability of the solution.
II. FAULT SCENARIOS
The analysis for this study focused on a typical system design used for a ground mounted single-axis tracker system shown schematically in Fig. 1 . Fig. 1 also shows the labels used for all the conductors in the dc portion of the PV system. It was assumed that dc cables in the system were protected by metal raceways and that the PV string wires (L1, L2, L1 * , and L2 * ) and dc Feeder Cables (L1 and L2 ) could share the same raceway, such as a cable tray. The study also assumed that parallelconnected dc Feeders (L1 * and L2 * ) could share the same raceway with these conductors. These assumptions influenced the fault scenarios that were considered for the study.
The conductor labels in Fig. 1 were used to identify and analyze the fault scenarios in this study. Faults were described by the shorts involving the labeled conductors. The labels with the prime notation (') are combiner box output circuit feeder cables (PV Output Circuits in NEC language) and those without are PV string cables (PV Source Circuits in NEC language). Conductors labeled "1" are grounded conductors, while those labeled "2" are ungrounded conductors. The equipment grounding conductor (EGC) shown as a blue dashed line is a simplified representation of the network of grounding conductors that connect module frames, combiner box cabinets, and other conductive surfaces to a common ground point at the inverter. The figure shows an example fault with red lines indicating the location of short-circuits. The example is a double ground-fault scenario (F6), similar to faults that occurred in the Bakersfield and Mt. Holly incidents. The pink and orange arrows show current from parallel connected combiner boxes and parallel connected strings, respectively. The dashed arrows represent normal current flow and the solid arrows represent abnormal current flow caused by the fault.
The study team created matrices of conductor-to-conductor and conductor-to-ground combinations to derive a list of dc fault scenarios of interest. A summary of the conductor-to-conductor fault matrix is shown in Table I using the conductor labels illustrated in Fig. 1 and "G" for ground. The yellow fault combinations identified faults that were not protected by the overcurrent protection and GFP used in typical PV system designs. These fault scenarios were combined with unprotected fault scenarios identified from an analogous matrix of conductor-to-ground faults. The two matrices produced 11 unprotected fault combinations that were of concern for this study. For reference purposes, two relatively well-protected ground fault scenarios (L2-G and L2 -G) were added to the study. The resulting 13 faults are listed in the column headings in Table II and were classified into five  categories: 1) single line to ground faults; 2) single line to line faults; 3) double line to line faults; 4) double line to ground faults; 5) multiple combination faults. All of the faults were characterized by the conductor or conductors involved (Ex: L2-G), where the conductors were shorted together, shorted to a grounded surface, or in two cases, open circuited.
The system diagram in Fig. 1 illustrates a resistively grounded system and consequently includes a resistor in the intentional bond between the grounded conductor bus (positive in this case) and ground. The trip setting for the series GFP circuit breaker was 300 mA. While a positive-grounded system is shown in Fig. 1 , the principals of the fault scenarios and mitigation methods are identical for negative-grounded systems as well. The 13 faults evaluated in Table II assumed the PV System was built from a resistively grounded design. Faults F14 and F15 were added for solidly grounded systems and allow for extension of the conclusions to these systems. Most of the discussion in this paper applies to both resistively and solidly grounded systems, unless otherwise noted. 
III. MITIGATION METHODS
A total of 20 fault-mitigation methods were identified by the study team for inclusion in the FMEA and are listed in Table II . Some of the options involve basic measures using available equipment and wiring methods. Other methods are less developed (or even code compliant) but recognized by industry researchers as potential solutions for future commercialization. The methods can be split into four broad categories: 1) wiring methods (M1); 2) modified overcurrent protection methods (M2); 3) ground fault detection methods (M3, M4, and M5); 4) arc-fault detection methods at a variety of circuit locations (M6). The wiring methods consisted of using PV Wire rated conductors instead of USE-2 rated conductors (M1a), separating the PV source circuit conductors (string wires) from the PV output circuit conductors (dc feeders) (M1b), and using twowire multiconductor cables for the string wires and dc feeders. The multiconductor cable would provide two layers of protection, the individual conductor's insulation and jacket and the multiconductor cable's jacket. The modified overcurrent protection mitigation methods included fusing both positive and negative poles for the string wires and the dc feeder (M2a) and installing a blocking diode in each string (M2b).
Several types of ground fault detection methods were considered. First, modifications to the ground reference circuit were considered. This included increasing the sensitivity of the ground current detection circuit to 50 mA (M3c) and a current transducer capable of sensing the direction of the ground current (M3a). M3a would trip the moment the ground current exceeded that of the leakage current, causing a change in the direction of the ground current, or when the magnitude of the current exceeded 50 mA. Additionally, the use of both continuous (M3b) and periodic (M3d) isolation measurements were evaluated as alternatives to current based detection schemes. The periodic isolation measurements (M3d) were assumed to be performed during the night-time hours so as to not impact energy production. The second class of GFP mitigation methods considered was string differential current (SDC) measurements that would trip when the differential current exceeded 50 mA. For these mitigation methods, a differential current was measured on each string and the fault current was interrupted by either a one-pole contactor (breaking either the positive or negative conductors) on that string (M4a), a two-pole contactor (breaking both the positive and negative conductors) on the output of the combiner box (M4b), or a two-pole contractor on the string (M4c). The third class of GFP methods used dc feeder differential current (FDC) measurements that would also trip when the differential current exceeded 50 mA. For these methods, the differential current was measured at the output of the combiner box and the contactor was located on each string in the combiner box (M5a), on dc feeder at inverter's input bus (M5b), or on the dc feeder at the combiner box output (M5c). An FDC option was also considered with the detector and contactor located on each dc feeder at the inverter's input bus (M5d).
The last category of mitigation methods considered was arcfault circuit interrupt (AFCI) protection. The interrupter for the fault was either a two-pole contactor on each dc feeder input at the inverter (M6a, M6b, and M6c) or a two-pole contactor on the output of the combiner box (M6d). The detector was assumed to respond to either a series or parallel arc fault. M6a, M6b, and M6c tried to account for differences in effectiveness of the solution if the first or second fault produced an arc in the double and multifault scenarios. 
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD
The risk assessment was conducted using an FMEA scoring processes that is well established in the electronics industry. The process evaluates a failure mode (fault in this study) using three criteria: Severity, Occurrence, and Detection. The criteria are defined as follows. 1) Severity is the level of negative impact or seriousness of the effect of the fault. 2) Occurrence is the probability of the effect (fault) occurring. 3) Detection is the probability that the mitigation method will detect or prevent the effect produced by fault. The scores for each criteria range from 1 to 10, with 1 being good and 10 being bad. The rating system for each criterion was adapted as needed for this study and then consistently applied across the entire fault-mitigation matrix shown in Table II , allowing for reliable relative comparisons across the entire matrix. The Severity for each fault was established based on the effect generated by the fault in the initial state, that is, with historically designed fault protection in place. Occurrence and Detection scores were assigned based on the improvements or detriments offered by each of the alternate mitigation methods. In order to better facilitate comparisons of the alternative mitigation methods, the severity was held fixed across all the mitigation methods considered for a particular fault.
Once the FMEA scores were defined, they were combined by computing the risk priority number (RPN), which is the product of the Severity, Occurrence and Detection scores. The RPNs were then screened using ࣘ84 as the acceptable risk threshold and ࣘ42 as the desired effectiveness threshold. These thresholds were used to create a heat map color scheme for Tables II and III. The acceptable risk threshold was defined based on the effectiveness of initial state design at mitigating ungrounded conductor faults in a resistively grounded system (F10), which is generally considered to be adequate, but not without limitations. The desired risk threshold was based on the RPN for the same fault in a solidly grounded system (F14) where the fault currents will be much larger than in a resistively grounded system, improving the detectability of the fault.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The FMEA analysis revealed that the Initial State design has a high risk (RPN > 84) for 5 of the 13 faults evaluated as shown in Table III . The faults are F5, F6, F7, F11, and F13. Each of these faults involves a ground fault on a grounded conductor, either at the string level or at the feeder level. These faults include those believed to be the cause of the thermal events mentioned in Section I, and their relative high scores both corroborate the general industry concern and suggest that priority be placed on improving their mitigation.
At first glance, several of the mitigation methods scored very well with RPNs ࣘ 42 for 8 or more of the 13 faults and an average RPN ࣘ 54. Table IV reports that these methods include 1) M3b-continuous isolation monitoring; 2) M4b-SDC measurements with a contactor on the combiner box output; 3) M4c-SDC measurements with a contactor on each combiner box input; Three joint methods achieved the desired effectiveness for all 13 faults and are highlighted in green. The two joint methods highlighted in yellow do not provide the desired effectiveness on all of the high-risk faults, but they do meet the acceptable risk threshold for all of these faults. 4) M5a-FDC measurements at the combiner box with a contactor on each combiner box input; 5) M5c-FDC measurements at the combiner box with a contactor on the combiner box output; 6) M6d-AFCI measurements at the combiner box with a contactor on the combiner box output; While M4b and M4c address the largest number of fault scenarios, they do not adequately address all of the high-risk faults, in particular F7 and F13 (ground faults on grounded dc feeders). Conversely, M3b addresses all of the high-risk faults, but does not sufficiently address five of the lower risk faults. Therefore, M3b, M4b, and M4c are not sufficient standalone mitigation methods. Furthermore, mitigation methods M4c and M5a added complexity and cost over comparably effective methods M4b and M5c, respectively. As a result, they were eliminated from the portfolio of possible mitigation methods. In the end, none of the mitigation methods are universally effective and achieve an RPN ࣘ 42 for all 13 faults. Consequently, it is necessary to implement a combination of methods to address all 13 faults. These combinations will be referred to as joint methods in this study.
A. Solutions Using Joint Methods
By combining two mitigation methods, it is possible to reduce the risk for all 13 faults. Table II shows that only two mitigation methods have the desired effectiveness for F13, namely continuous isolation monitoring (M3b) and FDC protection at the inverter (M5d). Therefore, for resistively grounded systems, all of the acceptable joint methods must include one of these methods. Table IV shows the results for six such joint methods, along with two other joint methods that use night-time isolation monitoring (M3d), that produced the desired effectiveness on 10 or more of the 13 faults. Three of these eight combinations protect against all 13 faults. For example, by combining FDC protection at the inverter (M5d) with SDC protection (M4b) or combiner box AFCI protection (M6d), all 13 faults are mitigated and the average RPN across the 13 faults is ࣘ18. Similarly, joining continuous isolation monitoring (M3b) with combiner box AFCI protection (M6d) addresses all 13 faults and produces an average RPN of 20. The two joint methods that employ night-time isolation monitoring do not provide the desired effectiveness for all 13 faults, but their average RPN is very good (ࣘ35) and the RPN for all faults is less than the acceptable risk threshold. Thus, the night-time isolation monitoring joint methods offer a very useful improvement in fault protection for resistively grounded PV systems.
Almost all of the joint methods involve combining an inverter mitigation method with a combiner box method. Out of the three combiner box methods used in Table V (AFCI, FDC, and SDC), the combiner box AFCI method (M6d) has the distinct advantages of being less costly to implement and of being required in all systems by the 2014 NEC. Thus, it seems to be a much more viable solution than SDC sensing and feeder differential current sensing. While the combiner AFCI solution is commercially available today, there is evidence that further improvements are needed to address nuisance trips and missed events.
On the inverter side, the joint methods rely on adding continuous isolation monitoring (M3b), night-time isolation monitoring (M3d), or FDC protection (M5d) to the inverter. Components for both isolation monitoring and feeder differential current protection solutions are already on the market and can be incorporated into inverter or recombiner equipment. These solutions have historically suffered from NEC compliance challenges, but the challenges have largely been addressed in the 2014 NEC. In fact, the 2014 NEC endorses these methods by requiring the implementation of improved GFP. However, the FDC solution still requires the addition of costly contactors on each circuit, which will slow its adoption. The continuous isolation monitoring solution has the disadvantage of requiring that both positive and negative poles be fused if the system is classified as an ungrounded system by the NEC. Thus, the night-time isolation monitoring solution likely offers the best compromise between improvement in fault protection and adding the least amount of cost to the system.
B. Solutions for Solidly Grounded Systems
These conclusions can easily be extended to solidly ground systems by incorporating the RPNs from faults F14 and F15 into the analysis. Table III presents the RPN values for F14 and F15 alongside the RPN values for the same faults in a resistively grounded system. As intuition would suggest, continuous isolation monitoring (M3b) is no longer effective in a solidly grounded system because the grounded conductors cannot be monitored with this mitigation method. However, method M3a (directional current detection) is basically as effective in a solid grounded system as method M3b is in a resistively grounded system. In essence, this is the most sensitive continuous detection scheme achievable in the ground reference circuit for grounded conductor ground faults. It would be activated the moment the fault current is greater than the leakage current, at which point the direction of the current in the ground reference will change. Thus, all the conclusions made on resistively grounded systems apply to solidly grounded systems, except that method M3b must be replaced by method M3a. Method M3a also has the same cost advantages over the FDC solution for the reasons described when method M3b was discussed. Similarly, GFP with high sensitivity detection (M3c) is comparable with nighttime isolation monitoring in a resistively grounded system in that its RPN exceeds the desired effectiveness threshold but it meets the acceptable risk threshold. This method can also be implemented at a lower cost than M3a because the required components are more readily available on the market today. Therefore, analogous joint methods that use M3c, such as M3c and M6d, offer a good solution that could be implemented today at a more reasonable price point.
VI. CONCLUSION
The study identifies five high-risk fault scenarios that should be addressed with PV system design improvements. All of the high-risk faults can be effectively mitigated with improved GFP for both ungrounded and grounded conductor faults, as is now required in the 2014 NEC. All new PV system designs should be required to provide GFP for faults with fault currents ࣙ50 mA on any current carrying conductor. A very effective fault protection system also needs to improve the protection against single and double line faults, although this is less urgent.
The best GFP method will depend on whether the PV system is resistively or solidly grounded. For resistively grounded systems, inverter impedance monitoring should be implemented. In solidly grounded systems, a directional ground current detector or a high sensitivity detector is required. Joint methods that join these improvements with combiner box AFCI protection are very effective in mitigating all of faults analyzed in this study. The addition of AFCI equipment also provides protection against series arc faults, which were not included in this analysis.
